Просмотр кода страницы Обсуждение:Ислам

== Уточнение ==
С точки зрения обычного пользователя хотел обратить внимание на некоторые моменты. 
На мой взгляд старое определение о том, что  «Ислам  -...монотеистическая религия» было бы правильнее оставить. В статье написано, что «Ислам - ...одна из трех мировых религий» тогда как к мировым религиям относят не только ислам, христианство и иудаизм, но и индуиз, буддизм и др.

Необходимо отойти от утверждений немусульманских источников о том, что «Основатель ислама — пророк Мухаммед» тогда как в Коране сказано, что: «Воистину, религией у Аллаха является ислам» (3:19). Использование данного аята в статье принципиально важно, поскольку для статьи об исламе, в рамках Энциклопедии Корана – главный источник. 

Представляется также важным проверить, на предмет соответствия исламскому вероучению, предложение о том, что «В 610 году он (пророк Мухаммад) выступил в роли религиозного проповедника с призывом к сплочению арабов под знаменем единого Бога Аллаха». В этом предложении, в частности, вызывают вопросы, слова «религиозный проповедник»   и «с призывом к сплочению арабов». Понимается так, что пророк Мухаммад был не Пророком а  лишь религиозным проповедников, что непосредственно связано с утверждением о том, что он являлся основателем ислама.

В разделе «Течения» написано, что  в исламе образовались три основные направления: суннизм, шиизм и хариджизм.

Прежде всего, необходимо заметить, что  при составлении энциклопедии Корана следует опираться на фундаментальные источники. С этой точки зрения, насколько известно,  не существует источников, указывающих на то, что в  основе исламе,   есть какие-то направления и течения. 

Появление и существование  этих и других направлений больше относится к истории религий народов и  местностей, где они получили распространение.

В целом же, судя по истории исправлений,  по статье наблюдается положительная динамика.[[Участник:Иса|Иса]] ([[Обсуждение участника:Иса|обсуждение]]) 15:54, 9 ноября 2016 (PKT)
* Я пока использовал только [http://ponjatija.ru/node/222 один источник], перешёл ко [http://ponjatija.ru/node/5593 второму]. К мировым религиям относят ислам, христианство и буддизм. Иудаизм и индуизм - это национальные религии (евреев и части индийцев). Ислам, христианство и иудаизм также относят к авраамическим и «богооткровенным» религиям. В прежней версии было использовано около 10 источников. На счёт основателя даже не знаю. Считать, например, Адама основателем ислама будет выглядеть странно. Можно написать, что согласно исламской догматике, пророк Мухаммад - последний в череде исламских пророков. Так вроде было в предыдущей версии. То, что он был проповедником не лишает его звания пророка. Каждый пророк - проповедник, но не каждый проповедник - пророк. В разделе Течения написано, что сунниты, шииты и хариджиты разошлись по вопросу наследовании верховной власти после Сиффинской битвы. То, что ислам разделится на течения говорил Пророк в хадисе о «73 течениях».--[[Участник:Maqivi|Maqivi]] ([[Обсуждение участника:Maqivi|обсуждение]]) 16:29, 9 ноября 2016 (PKT)

== Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān ==
{|
|Инфинитив четвёртой формы арабского трёхбуквенного корня ''с-л-м'' в значении «представить», «сдаться», этим корнем также обозначают монотеистическую веру и практики, которого придерживаются последователи Мухаммада и провозглашённое Кораном.

;Предварительные соображения
Чтобы ограничить понятие ''ислам'', который выходит впервые в коранических высказываниях, необходимо иметь четкое представление о проблемах, которые это ограничение влечёт за собой. Это введение в заблуждение, чтобы собрать и проанализировать все стихи, содержащие формы ''ислам'' или ''муслим(ун)'' в попытке прийти к «объективному» определению, то считается адекватным, чтобы передать коранических ислам, который может навязать себя на верующих и исследователей как в конечном итоге и обязательным референтом. В частности, это так, если это определение используется для измерения и суждения об изменении и дополнении, внесённых в течение долгого времени в различных исторических и социально-культурных контекстах. В. С. Смит (Значение и конец) уже посетовал на недостаточность этого занятия, используя объектив историка религий, который был заинтересован в определении происхождения и прочного духовного уровня, которые составляют определенную валентность каждой религии. Смит использовал эту идентификацию, чтобы отличить изменяющиеся функции — положительные и отрицательные — присваиваемый социальных субъектов к тому, что они повсеместно называют свою религию. Примерно двадцать пять лет назад, студент Смита исследовал, в тонко детальном изучении, семантические сдвиги, которые термин ''ислам'' претерпел на протяжении многих веков развития экзегетики (J. Smith, Historical and semantic). Эта работа дополняет более ранние исследования Лидзбарски (Salām und islām), Кюнстлингера (‘Islām,’ ‘muslim,’ ‘aslama’ im Kurān), Ринггрена (Islam, ‘aslama and Muslim), Робсона (‘Islam’ as a term), Изутсу (Ethico-religious concepts in the Qurān), и самого В. С. Смита (Historical development).

С помощью тщательного филологического анализа должна быть возможность следовать уже на коранических стадии постепенной разработки понятия ''ислам'' в соответствии с хронологическим порядком стихов в их первоначальном контексте (см Хронология и Коран; Форма и структура Корана). Тем не менее, в отсутствие полного согласия по хронологических классификациях сур и тем более аятов, не возможно использовать эту перспективу? за исключением тех редких случаев, когда имеются относительно надёжные и последовательные указатели на основе которых будет возможны такие суждения. Известно как коллективные параллельные воспоминания были истолкованы в течение первых исламских веков и как эта мифологические и идеологические присвоения сообщили, что должно было стать парадигмой земной истории и истории спасения мусульманской общины (умма, см. общины и общества в Коране; История и Коран). Эта историко-мифическое парадигма до сих пор действует в начале XXI века с идеологической силой, которая поддерживается за счет современных средств массовой информации. Историкам необходимо, таким образом, чтобы использовать стратегии вмешательства для того, чтобы отделить мифические, идеологические и исторические нити в документации, приписываемой периоду становления и формирования той, которая продолжает быть универсально и без разбора называют «ислам».

Не ясно ли академические историки нечто большее, чем удовлетворение научного любопытства, когда они ставят себя задачу определения отличительные черты Исламе в строгих пределах Кораническое корпуса (см. Современные критические практики и Коран). Против этой позиции то, что мусульманских традиционалисты используют основополагающий текст для опоры доктринальной конструкции, необходимой для усиления ортодоксальности верующих (см Богословие и Коран; Толкование Корана: классический и средневековый период; Толкование Корана: ранняя современность и современность). Существует, однако, третья позиция, которая стремится открыть новое пространство разборчивости в пределах реальности живой религии, обходя гносеологические постулаты неявные в двух предыдущих подходов. В том случае ислама, как и в католической и протестантской теологии, «научное» и конфессиональные перспективы уже недостаточны для определения проблематики и темы благоприятной для интерактивного исследования (см. Le dictionnaire de théologie). С этой третьей точки зрения, достаточно установить, что то, что можно назвать кораническим этапом, конкретизация новой религии, представляющей собой сложный исторический процесс вовлечения одновременно социальных, политических (см. Политика и Коран), культурных и нормативных факторов. Они переплетается с ритуалами, обычаями, этикой, семейными структурами (смю Семья; Племена и роды, Родственики), конкурирующие структуры воображения и коллективную интерактивную память таких лиц, как евреи, христиане, сабиане, многобожники (часто называют «язычниками»), и все культурные группы древнего Ближнего Востока (см. Евреи и иудаизм, Христиане и христианство, Многобожие и атеизм, Вера и неверие, Доисламская Аравия и Коран). Все эти режимы и проявления исторического существования таких социальных групп в Аравии не только присутствуют в коранических дискурсах, но трансформируются. Они были сублимированы, оторваны от своих местных условий, чтобы представлять собой «экзистенциальную парадигму» человеческого состояния. Освобожденный от его конкретности, эта коранических парадигма способна производить и информирование индивидуального и коллективного существования в самых разнообразных культурных и исторических контекстах. Как и в случае библейского дискурса еврейской Библии и Нового Завета, коранический дискурс генерирует результаты, полученные путём объединения механизмов для точной лингвистической артикуляции смысла с разнообразными эффектами меняющихся исторических ситуаций. В обоих текстовых описательных корпусах, риторические, стилистические и литературные процессы настолько сложны и весьма разработаны, что в последнее время методы анализа дискурса ещё предстоит доказать достаточное для выполнения этой задачи выяснения их взаимодействия. Эти подходы — не говоря уже о классических теориях неповторимости (и’джаз) Корана — ещё предстоит адекватно объяснить генезис, эффекты и место Корана в рамках лингвистических и семиотических использований (см. Семиотика и характер в Коране, Язык Корана).

Термин «парадигма» является подходящим для обозначением его коранических проявлений, потому что это проявление стало вписанным в долгую историю, где гомологичные парадигмы иудаизма, христианства, зороастризма (см. Маги), и манихейства уже приобрели место в культурном и религиозном пространстве Средиземноморья. Термин «экзистенциальная парадигма» является более естественным и работоспособным, чем «религии», ибо она освобождает интеллектуальную задачу от концептуального ограничения, введённого этими системами веры и неверия, которые формируют тонким способом, часто бессознательно, интерпретацию фактов внутри каждой живой религиозной традиции. Кроме того, эта терминология позволяет включать в арену критической оценки всех унаследованных систем, парадигм или моделей исторического действия, производимых современным разумом в своей борьбе за освобождение себя от гнетущих догматике традиционных институциональных религий. Для того, чтобы следить за развитием событий в рамках коранических дискурса социального и языкового строительства категории «верующих» и «неверующих», как они относятся к тому, что будет называться словом «Ислам», является создание историчность новой религии. Это делает его на основе первых высказываниях то, что верующая традиция будет теоретизировать под названием «Слово Божье», раскрывается через Мухаммада б. 'Абдаллах, навязывая себя прогрессивно своим действием и коранических дискурса, как Пророк (ан-наби см. Пророки и пророчество) и посланник (Расуль) Бога. То есть сказать, что первоначальный выбор исторического метода для определения ислама на строго коранических основаниях не невинны. Она исходит из методологической и эпистемологической помещения характеристикой современной причины и вводит разрыв с осевым зрения, настаивая на том, что весь коранических дискурс привил правильно верующую отношение в сердце первых слушателей. Для всех последующих поколений Коран — это ориентированное понимание «Ислама» создает драму решения — принять или отвергнуть завет божественного союза (''мискат'' см. Договоры и союзы) — на которых будет зависеть реализация всего индивидуального существования мусульманской личности. Не имея преимущества, как и западное христианство, новых возможностей для освобождения человеческого состояния, такие как те открыли экзистенциальной парадигмы, построенной современности, или более эффективной альтернативой, чем представленный традиционными религиями, мусульмане продолжают жить по драме этого решения в течение смертельного насилия, где, кроме того, «немыслимым и неосмысленное» из двух противоборствующих парадигм интерпретируются как взаимно исключающие друг друга.

Теология, философия до сих пор решает и частичные проблемы социальных наук начали брать на себя ответственность исторической драмы человеческого состояния, несмотря на осложнённую альтернативу открытой современностью: выбор больше не просто между передачей земного существования в абсолютной верности долгу сигнификации кованой в завет вечный контракт с живым, милосердного Бога и спасителя (или мудрого основателя как Будда), или радикальный отказ от этого договора. Это не только между ошибочностью разума и одиночества судьбы за горизонтом надежды. В мире мысли современности, для многих людей Бог стал бесполезная гипотеза. Эта версия современности настаивает на том, что люди берут на себя ответственность за свою судьбу и заменяет образ прогресса науки для образа вечного спасения, гарантированного любящим и милосердным Богом.

;Коранический ислам
В книге, опубликованной в 1972 году (The spiritual background of early Islam. Studies in early Arab concepts), М. М. Бравманн собрал четырнадцать статей, которые он опубликовал в период между 1945 и 1971 годами. Что касается области исламоведения, эта работа, а также приведенные ранее, представляет очень эпистемиологическое отношение, которое не регулируется историческим письмом в Европе и Северной Америке с девятнадцатого века до 1970-х годов. Автор делает все возможное, чтобы вновь открыть для себя концептуальное содержание Корана, а именно такие термины, как ''ислам'', ''иман'' (см. Вера), ''дин'' (см. Религия), ''дунья'' (см. Мир), ''сунна'', ''сира'' (см. Сира и Коран) , '''ильм'' (см. Знание и обучение), ''бай’а'' (см. Клятва и обязательства), и т. д., в период раннего ислама. Исследование этимологии семантически богатого словарного запаса очень полезен до тех пор, пока человек не ограничиваться обманчивым субстратом. Опасность такого исследования заключается в стремлении довольствоваться частичным или окаменелым смыслом, который только слабо связан с живым продолжением переставшего быть дошедших до нас языка и общества. Этот тип эрудиции добился прогресса, однако, как можно проиллюстрировать со ссылкой на богатых произведения М. Дж. Кистера и его последователей на переходе от «джахилии (см. Эпохп невежества) к исламу». В этом последнем корпусе работы находят ориентацию в сторону социальной, политической и культурной истории, которые могли бы, наконец, сделать возможным историко-антропологическое прочтение Корана. (Смотрите также мои замечания о недавней работе Дж. Чабби, Le seigneur des tribus. L’islam de Mahomet, Париж 1997 в статье современных критических практиках и Коране). Эта цели, сама по себе, является признаком огромного прогресса в достижении критического подхода, который может объяснить не только зарождающуюся религию и свою порождающую терминологию, но и в тот момент, и парадигму человеческого творчества в его борьбе за концептуальное освобождение.

Ограничившись рассмотрением случаев употребления слова ''ислам'' или ''муслим'' в строгих пределах кораническое корпуса избегает ни ошибочность самого этого упражнения, ни методологические затруднения, присущие каждому поиску истоков. Это даже больше, тот случай, когда ум остается сосредоточенным на определении религии, которая возникла после коранического корпуса и его общества и в котором парадигм сфабрикованные в рамках антропологической сферы были пересмотрены. Я объяснил, что «закрытие официального свода» канонического кодекса (''мусхаф'') создает методологические проблемы, которые отличаются от тех, которые связаны с кораническим дискурсом во время своего первой устной передачи(см. Коллекция Корана; Рукописи Корана; Устная передача). Потому что он никогда не уважал эту дифференциацию, филологическую эксплуатацию «закрытого официального свода» соглашается, хотя и с большей заботой о хронологических ограничений, с когнитивным отношением традиционной мусульманской экзегетики (Тафсир аль-Куран би-ль-Куран).

М. М. Бравманн, например, уверяет, что слово ''ислам'' означает «противостоять смерти» (см. Смерть и мертвые), принося в жертву свою жизнь ради высшей цели и, таким образом, расширения, защищая свою честь, и отдавая себя безоговорочно Богу (см. Путь или дорога; Джихад). Эти две мотивировки не могут рассматриваться на том же уровне, но должны быть взаимосвязаны. Более сложным объяснением считается то, что термин означает «смерть за честь» ('ирд) клана, так как механическая солидарность в командной группе появляется в Коране как в качестве трамплина, с которого заменить привязанность к клану с поисками Бога и как препятствие на пути к этой замене.

Аяты 49:14 и 17 представляют это обманчивое использование семантического уравнения с противостоянием смерти, противопоставляя слово ''ислам'', которое стигматизирует как наружу, тактическое и отзывное присоединение к благородному делу Бога и Его посланника, к слову ''иман'', что означает искреннее и окончательное превращение сердца к делу, которое дифференцируется от клана (см. Вера и неверие, Лицемеры и лицемерие). Именно поэтому выражение «он представил свое лицо к Богу» (''аслама ваджхаху ли-Лляхи'') часто рецидивируется как призыв отдать самого себя только Богу. Глагол «представить» (''аслама'') происходит двадцать два раза; ''муслим'', мн. ''муслимун'' в общей сложности сорок два раза, в том числе один экземпляр двойственное и двух свидетелей женского множественного числа, ''муслимат'', для обозначения «мусульманок»; ''ислам'' появляется семь раз. Контраст с различными производными корневых букв ''’-м-н'', означающих «веру», «вероубеждение», поразителен: ''иман'' (17 раз), ''аману'' (258), муминун (166, из которых девятнадцать женского рода множественного числа, ''муминат''). Ислам в жертву своей жизни по-прежнему требовали, как те, кто не идут в бой осуждаются в соответствии с кодексом чести, который противопоставляется мужеству, доблести и желанию умереть как герой (см. Мученик) трусость, о государственной измене и бегству с поля боя (''ка’ада'' см. Войны, Походы и сражения, Достоинства и недостатки).

Заметно, что эти четкие определения ''ислам'' и ''иман'', а также приложение усилий (''джихад'') для Бога, появляются в двух поздних сурах: в 49-й ([[аль-Худжарат]]), которая классифицируется как 106-й в хронологическом порядке откровения, и 9-й ([[ат-Тавба]]), квалифицирующейся как 113-я. Взаимосвязь двух понятий в течение всего периода откровения зависит от меняющихся контекстов и главных героев в Мекке и Медина. В Мекке, где Мухаммад сталкивается с противодействием со стороны многобожников, определяемой как те, кто ни как не «связан» с единым Богом (''мушрикун''), было необходимо подчеркнуть веру в единого Бога; перед еврейскими противниками в Медине (ар-раббанийюн), тем не менее, важно было построить цельную историю для нового религиозного сообщества, чтобы вставить его в библейской серии откровений (см. Писание и Коран), которые были даны Аврааму, Моисею, и к Иисусу сыну Марии (см. также Противодействие Мухаммаду). Именно в этом исламском переприсвоении этих великих религиозных деятелей, что возникающая религия берёт на себя измерение религиозного пространства для сообщества, которое постепенно дифференцируются от других конкурирующих сообществ, участвующих в подражательной бою над контролем того же символического капитала. Для мушриков символический капитал сосредоточен на мекканском пантеоне, в то время как для евреев и христиан он сосредоточен на предыдущих библейских откровениях. Для того, чтобы изменить фигуру Авраама Коран использует термин ''миллат Ибрахим'', а не слово ислам, чьё значение всё ещё находится в процессе строительства. ''Милла'' относится к группе, члены которой обязательно разделяют одни и те же убеждения. Этот термин в дальнейшем будет использоваться повторно для обозначения различных конфессиональных общин в Османской империи. В аяте {{hqa|3|67}}, Авраам связан с чистой религии, ханифизм (см. Ханиф), что лишено каких-либо отклонений: «Авраам не был ни иудеем, ни христианином, а был ханифом мусульманином». В этом контексте, в котором исправлены и возмещены версии (довольно сильно отличающиеся от «измененных» версий христиан и евреев) в истории «люди Книги» (см. также Книга) строится, слово ''муслим'' не может быть переведено просто как «мусульманин» в ныне общепринятом значении этого слова, так как он ещё не имеет социальную и доктринальные основы. Её смысл в этом отрывке действительно ссылка на это внутреннее представление веры, которая стягивается в Завет (''мискат'') с Богом. В часто цитируемых стихах «религия в глазах Бога является ислам» ({{hqa|3|19}}); или «От того, кто ищет иную религию помимо ислама, это никогда не будет принято» ({{hqa|3|85}}), необходимо сохранить первоначальный, фундаментальный смысл слова ''ислам'' как интернализованного религиозного отношения, хорошо символизируемого поведением коранического Авраама. Для того, чтобы освятить на данном этапе эквивалентность Авраамтческого ''ислама'' с тем, что наука и институты называют Исламский позже истолковать, чтобы низвести к «немыслимым» все проблемы, связанные с переходом от человеческого опыта божественного («l’expérience humaine du divin», title of a work of M. Meslin) к институционализированной, ритуальной, религиозной ортодоксии из «управляющих священным»(gestionnaires du sacré). Для того чтобы избежать этого длинного скачка в рамках идеологической инструментализации религиозной реальности, предпочтительнее говорить о религии формирующейся на уровне коранического дискурса в начальном режиме дикции.

Там нет места чтобы оценить роль нормативных высказываний, которые, уже в кораническом дискурсе, участие опыта божественного с траекторией ритуализации, в сакрализацию учреждения (см. Ритуал и Коран). Скорее всего, я сигнализировал важность анализа процесса, с помощью которого, на уровне «закрытого официального свода», что институционализация приходит к функционированию в качестве концептуализации ислама, эксплуатируемого правоведами (см. Закон и Коран), теологами, экзегетами, мистиками (см. Суфизм и Коран) и все разновидности социальных субъектов.

Стоит помнить о том, что на стадии устного произнесения, коранический дискурс придает большее значение декламации фундамента новой коллективной памяти, тот, который готов принять систему верований и не-верований, которая является одновременно похожей чтобы и дифференцировать от конкурирующих сообществ, чем доктринальное развитие ортодоксии. Это было сделано более поздними поколениями. Литературная композиция из этих историй оказала решающую смысловую оценку влияния на арабский словарь (см. Арабский язык; Грамматика и Коран). В этом повышенном содержании язык был укреплен, чтобы поддержать новую систему ценностей и переделке как язык, который несет на себе земную историю, которая полностью вписана в горизонт истории спасения, уже знакомых с людьми Писания. Кроме того, следует иметь в виду, что эти основатели истории, а также неопределенного состояния концептуальных инструментов в рамках коранических стадии, делают возможными многие отправные точки для символических, смысловых, концептуальных и, наконец, экзистенциальных кодов. Необходимо проверить, поэтому, степень духовной, этической, социальной, юридической и политической значимости для этого кодирования, что будущие актеры будут «выбирать» или которые будут наложены на различные группы, которые составляют себя как «интерпретирующих сообществ». Это тип исследования не было ни задумано, ни приняты историками, толкователями или современными богословами критической современности. Можно, подавно, оправдывать средневековых правоведов за не придавали законченный вид этой задачи, которая была немыслима для них, в их претензии на корень (''та’силь'') юридической квалификации (''хукм'') в Слове Божьем, которое превратит профанное и условное поведение в категории легальное или нелегальное работ, совместимых с понятием окончательного судебного решения (см. Последний суд; Добрые дела; Злодеяния; Законное и незаконное; Отчет о человеческих действиях).

Теперь, однако, было достаточно концептуального разнообразия, необходимого для радикализации критики исламского разума, которая может быть проведена в рамках более широкой и более исторически, социологически и антропологически чувствительных перспектив.
|The infinitive of the fourth form of the Arabic triliteral root s-l-m meaning “to submit,” “to surrender,” it also designates the monotheistic faith (q.v.) and practice observed by the followers of Muḥammad and exhorted by the Qurʾān.

;Preliminary considerations

To restrict the notion of islām to that which emerges for the first time within the qurʾānic pronouncements, it is necessary to be clear about the problems that this limitation implies. It is misleading to gather and analyse all the verses that contain the forms islām or muslim(ūn) in an effort to arrive at an “objective” definition then deemed adequate to convey a qurʾānic Islam which can impose itself upon believers and researchers as the ultimate and obligatory referent. Particularly is this so if that definition is used to measure and to judge the changes and additions introduced over time in diverse historical and socio-cultural contexts. W.C. Smith(Meaning and end) already lamented the insufficiency of this exercise using the lens of a historian of religions who was interested in the identification of the origin and durable spiritual level which constitute the specific valence of each religion. Smith used this identification to distinguish the changing functions — positive and negative — assigned by the social actors to that which they universally call their religion. About twenty-five years ago, a student of Smith's explored, in a finely detailed study, the semantic shifts which the term islām has undergone over many centuries of exegetical ¶ amplification (J. Smith, Historical and semantic). This work complements the earlier investigations of Lidzbarski (Salām und islām), Künstlinger (‘Islām,’ ‘muslim,’ ‘aslama’ im Kurān), Ringgren(Islam, ʿaslama and Muslim), Robson (‘Islam’ as a term), Izutsu (Ethico-religious concepts in the Qurʾān), and W.C. Smith himself (Historical development).


Using careful philological analysis it should be possible to follow already at the qurʾānic stage the progressive elaboration of the notion of islām according to the chronological order of the verses in their original contexts (see chronology and the qurʾān; form and structure of the qurʾān). Yet in the absence of complete accord about the chronological classifications proposed for the sūras and a fortiori for the verses, one may not employ this perspective except for the rare cases where there are relatively reliable and coherent indices upon which to base such judgments. One knows how the collective concurrent memories were construed during the first Islamic centuries and how this mythological and ideological appropriation informed what was to become the paradigm of the earthly history and the salvation history of the Muslim community (umma, see community and society in the qurʾān; history and the qurʾān). This historical-mythical paradigm still operates at the beginning of the twenty-first century with an ideological force that is sustained by the modern media. The historian needs, therefore, to employ strategies of intervention in order to disentangle the mythical, ideological and historical strands in the documentation ascribed to the period of the emergence and formation of that which continues to be universally and indiscriminately termed “Islam.”


It is not clear whether academic historians see anything more than the satisfaction ¶ of a scientific curiosity when they put themselves to the task of defining the distinctive traits of islām within the strict limits of the qurʾānic corpus (see contemporary critical practices and the qurʾān ). Against this attitude, there is that of traditionalist Muslim theologians who use the foundational text to shore up the doctrinal constructions necessary to reinforce the orthodoxy demanded of the believers (see theology and the qurʾān; exegesis of the qurʾān: classical and medieval; exegesis of the qurʾān: early modern and contemporary). There is, however, a third position which seeks to open a new space of intelligibility within the reality of lived religion by circumventing the epistemological postulations implicit in the two preceding approaches. In the case of Islam, as in Catholic and Protestant theology, the “scientific” and the confessional perspectives are no longer adequate for defining the problematics and the themes favorable to an interactive research (cf. Le dictionnaire de théologie). From this third perspective, it suffices to establish that what can be called the qurʾānic stage, the instantiation of a new religion, is a complex historical process engaging simultaneously social, political (see politics and the qurʾān ), cultural, and normative factors. These are entangled with ritual, customs, ethics, familial structures (see family; tribes and clans; kinship), competing structures of the imagination and the collective interactive memory of such entities as Jews, Christians, Sabians (q.v.), polytheists (frequently termed “pagans”), and all cultural groups of the ancient Near East (see jews and judaism; christians and christianity; polytheism and atheism; belief and unbelief; pre-islamic arabia and the qurʾān). All these modes and manifestations of the historical existence of such social groups in Arabia are not only pres-¶ ent in the qurʾānic discourse but transformed. They have been sublimated, uprooted from their local conditions to constitute an “existential paradigm” of the human condition. Divested of its particularity, this qurʾānic paradigm is capable of producing and informing individual and collective existence within the most diverse cultural and historical contexts. As with the biblical discourse of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, the qurʾānic discourse generates the results obtained by combining mechanisms for precise linguistic articulation of the meaning with the diverse effects of changing historical situations. In both textual corpora the narrative, rhetorical, stylistic and literary processes are so complex and highly elaborated that recent methods of discourse analysis have yet to prove sufficient for the task of clarifying their interaction. These approaches — to say nothing of the classical theories of the inimitability (q.v.; iʿjāz ) of the Qurʾān — have yet to explain adequately the genesis, the effects and the place of the Qurʾān within linguistic and semiotic usages (see semiotics and nature in the qurʾān; language of the qurʾān).


The term “paradigm” is an appropriate designation for its qurʾānic manifestation because this manifestation became inscribed in a long history where the homologous paradigms of Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism (see magians ), and Manichaeism had already assumed a place within the cultural and religious space of the Mediterranean. The term “existential paradigm” is more natural and workable than that of “religion,” for it frees the intellectual task from the conceptual constraint imposed by those systems of belief and nonbelief which shape in a subtle fashion, often unconsciously, the interpretation of the facts within each living religious tradition. Further, this terminology ¶ allows the inclusion within the arena of critical assessment of all the inherited systems, paradigms or models of historical action produced by modern reason in its struggle to liberate itself from the oppressive dogmatics of traditional institutional religions. To follow the developments within the qurʾānic discourse of the social and linguistic construction of the categories of “believers” and “nonbelievers,” as these relate to what would be called “Islam,” is to establish the historicity of the new religion. It is to do this on the basis of the first pronouncements of that which the believing tradition would theorize under the name of “Word of God” (q.v.), revealed through Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, imposing himself progressively by his action and by the qurʾānic discourse, as the Prophet (al- nabī, see prophets and prophethood ) and messenger (q.v.; rasūl) of God. That is to say that the initial choice of the historical method to define Islam on strictly qurʾānic grounds is not innocent. It proceeds from a methodological and epistemological premise characteristic of modern reason and introduces a break with the axial vision, insisting that the entire qurʾānic discourse instilled the properly believing attitude in the heart (q.v.) of the first listeners. For all subsequent generations this Qurʾān-centric understanding of “Islam” creates the drama of the decision — to accept or reject the covenant of divine alliance ( mīthāq, see contracts and alliances ) — on which would depend the realization of the entire individual existence of the Muslim person. Without having the benefit, as did western Christianity, of new possibilities for the emancipation of the human condition such as those opened by the existential paradigm constructed by modernity or by a more efficacious alternative than that presented by the traditional religions, Muslims continue to live the drama of that decision within a deadly ¶ violence where, additionally, the “unthinkable and unthought” of the two opposing paradigms are interpreted as mutually exclusive.

The theologies, the philosophies, and the still hesitant and partial problematics of the social sciences have begun to take charge of the historical drama of the human condition despite being complicated by the alternative opened by modernity: the choice is no longer simply between passing earthly existence in absolute fidelity to the debt of signification forged within the eternal covenant contracted with a living, merciful God and savior (or a wise founder like Buddha), or the radical refusal of that pact. It is not only between the fallibility of reason and the solitude of a destiny beyond the horizon of hope. Within the thought world of modernity, for many people God has become a useless hypothesis. This version of modernity insists that humans take responsibility for their destiny and substitutes an image of progress by science for the image of eternal salvation guaranteed by a loving and compassionate God.

;Qurʾānic Islam

In a book issued in 1972 (The spiritual background of early Islam. Studies in early Arab concepts), M. M. Bravmann brought together fourteen articles which he had published between 1945 and 1971. With regard to the domain of Islamic studies, this work, as well as that cited earlier, is very representative of the epistemological attitude that governed historical writing in Europe and North America from the nineteenth century until the 1970s. The author does his utmost to rediscover the conceptual contents of the Qurʾān, namely terms like islām, īmān (see faith ), dīn (see religion ), dunyā (see world ), sunna (q.v.), sīra (see sīra and the qurʾān ), ʿilm (see knowledge and learning ), bayʿa (see oaths and¶ pledges ), etc., in the period of emerging Islam. Investigation of the etymologies of a semantically rich vocabulary is very useful as long as one does not content oneself with deceptive substrata. The danger of such research lies in the tendency to rest content with partial or fossilized meanings that are only poorly related to the living continuation of a no-longer extant language and society. This type of erudition has made progress, however, as can be illustrated with reference to the rich works of M.J. Kister and his followers on the transition from “ jāhiliyya (see age of ignorance ) to Islām.” In this latter body of work one finds an orientation towards a social, political and cultural history that could finally make a historical-anthropological reading of the Qurʾān possible. (See also my remarks on the recent work of J. Chabbi, Le seigneur des tribus. L'islam de Mahomet, Paris 1997 in the article contemporary critical practices and the qurʾān .) Aiming at such an objective is, in itself, a sign of immense progress toward a critical approach that can explain not only a nascent religion and its generative terminology but also the moment and the paradigm of human creativity in its struggle for conceptual emancipation.

Confining oneself to an examination of the occurrences of the word islām or muslim within the strict limits of the qurʾānic corpus avoids neither the fallibility of that exercise itself nor the methodological quandaries inherent in every quest for origins. This is even more the case when the mind remains focused on a definition of the religion that emerged subsequent to the qurʾānic corpus and its society and in which the paradigms forged within the anthropological scope were redefined. I have explained that the “closed official corpus” of the canonical codex ( muṣḥaf , q.v.) poses methodological problems that are different from those linked to qurʾānic discourse at ¶ the time of its first oral enunciation (see collection of the qurʾān; codices of the qurʾān; orality). Because it has never respected this differentiation, the philological exploitation of the “closed official corpus” concurs, though with greater care for chronological constraints, with the cognitive attitude of traditional Muslim exegesis (tafsīr al-Qurʾān bi-l-Qurʾān).

M. M. Bravmann, for example, assures us that the word islām has meant confronting death (see death and the dead ), sacrificing one's life for a higher goal and thus, by extension, defending one's honor (q.v.), and giving oneself unconditionally to God (see path or way; jihād). These two motivations cannot be treated on the same level but must be interrelated. More complexly, then, the term means dying for the honor( ʿirḍ) of the clan because the mechanical solidarity in a command group appears in the Qurʾān both as a springboard from which to substitute the attachment to the clan with the quest for God and as an obstacle to this substitution.

q 49:14 and 17 unveil this deceptive use of a semantic equation with the confrontation of death by opposing the word islām, which is stigmatized as an outward, tactical and revocable adherence to the noble cause of God and his messenger, to the word īmān, which signifies a sincere and definitive conversion of the heart to a cause that is differentiated from that of the clan (see belief and unbelief; hypocrites and hypocrisy). This is why the expression “he submitted his face (q.v.) to God” ( aslama wajhahu lillāhi) recurs often as a summons to give one's self only to God. The verb “to submit” (aslama) occurs twenty-two times; muslim, pl. muslimūn a total of forty-two times, including one instance of the dual and two attestations of the feminine plural, muslimāt, to designate female “Muslims”; islām appears seven ¶ times. The contrast with the attestations of the various derivatives of the root letters ʾ-m-n, signifying “belief, faith,” is striking: īmān (seventeen times), āmanū (258), muʾminūn (166, of which nineteen are the feminine plural, muʾmināt). Islam as the sacrifice of one's life is still demanded, as those who avoid going into combat are denounced according to a code of honor that opposes courage (q.v.), valiancy and the wish to die as a hero (see martyr ) to cowardice, treason, and fleeing from battle ( qaʿada, see war; expeditions and battles; virtues and vices).

One will note that these clear-cut definitions of islām and īmān, as well as of the conditions of the endeavor ( jihād) for God, appear in two late sūras: in q 49, which is classified as the 106th in the chronological order of revelation, and q 9, classified as the 113th. The interrelation of the two concepts during the whole period of the revelation depended on the changing contexts and protagonists in Mecca (q.v.) and Medina (q.v.). In Mecca, where Muḥammad faced opposition from the polytheists, defined as those who “associated” anything with the one God ( mushrikūn), it was necessary to stress the belief in a single God; facing the Jewish adversaries in Medina (al- rabbāniyyūn), however, it was important to construct a founding story for the new religious community in order to insert it into the biblical series of revelations (see scripture and the qurʾān ) that were made to Abraham (q.v.), to Moses (q.v.), and to Jesus (q.v.) son of Mary (q.v.; see also opposition to muḥammad ). It is in this Islamic re-appropriation of these great religious figures that the emerging religion takes on the dimension of a religious space for a community that has slowly become differentiated from other rival communities engaged in a mimetic combat over the control of the same symbolic capital. For the mushrikūn, this symbolic capital is centered ¶ on the Meccan pantheon while for Jews and Christians it is focused on the previous biblical revelations. In order to reshape the figure of Abraham, the Qurʾān uses the term millat Ibrāhīm rather than the word islām, whose signification is still in the course of construction. Milla refers to a group whose members necessarily share the same beliefs. This term will later be reused to designate the various confessional communities in the Ottoman Empire. In q 3:67, Abraham is linked to the pure religion, Ḥanīfism (see ḥanīf ), that is devoid of any deviation: “Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but a ḥanīf muslim.” Within this context in which a corrected and redressed version (quite different from the “altered” versions of the Christians and the Jews) of the history of the “ People of the Book” (q.v.; see also book ) is constructed, the word muslim cannot be translated simply as “Muslim” in the now common meaning of the word, since it does not yet have a social and doctrinal basis. Its meaning in this passage is indeed a reference to that internal submission of faith which is contracted in the alliance ( mīthāq) with God. In the frequently cited verses “religion, in the eye of God, is Islam” ( q 3:19); or “The will to profess a religion other than Islam will not be accepted” ( q 3:85), it is necessary to preserve the original, fundamental meaning of islām as an internalized religious attitude that is well symbolized by the conduct of the qurʾānic Abraham. To consecrate at this stage the equivalence of the Abrahamic islām with that which the sciences and institutions termed Islamic would later construe, is to relegate to the “unthinkable” all of the problems associated with the passage from the human experience of the divine (“l'expérience humaine du divin,” title of a work of M. Meslin) to the institutionalized, ritualized, religious orthodoxy of the “managers of the sacred” (gestionnaires du sacré). In ¶ order to avoid this long leap within the ideological instrumentalization of the religious reality, it is preferable to speak of the religion emerging at the level of the qurʾānic discourse in its initial mode of enunciation.

There is no room here to evaluate the role of the normative pronouncements which, already in the qurʾānic discourse, engage the experience of the divine with the trajectory of ritualization, of the sacralizing institution (see ritual and the qurʾān ). Rather, I signal the importance of analyzing the process by which, at the level of the “closed official corpus,” that institutionalization comes to function as the conceptualization of Islam that is exploited by the jurists (see law and the qurʾān ), the theolgians, the exegetes, the mystics (see ṣūfism and the qurʾān ) and all varieties of social actors.


It is worth remembering that, at the stage of its oral enunciation, the qurʾānic discourse attaches more importance to recitations of the foundation of a new collective memory, one that is prepared to receive a system of beliefs and of non-beliefs that is both similar to and differentiated from those of competing communities, than to the doctrinal development of orthodoxy. This was done by later generations. The literary composition of these stories has exerted a decisive semantic influence on Arabic vocabulary (see arabic language; grammar and the qurʾān). In its enhanced contents the language was fortified to support the new system of values and recast as a language that bears an earthly history which is entirely inscribed within the horizon of a history of salvation (q.v.) already familiar to the People of the Book. One should also bear in mind that these founding stories, as well as the indeterminate state of the conceptual tools within the qurʾānic stage, make possible many ¶ starting points for symbolic, semantic, conceptual and, finally, existential codes. It is necessary to verify, therefore, the degree of spiritual, ethical, social, juridical and political relevance for this coding that future actors will “choose,” or which will be imposed upon diverse groups who constitute themselves as “interpretive communities.” This type of investigation has been neither conceived nor adopted by the historians, the exegetes or the contemporary theologians of critical modernity. One can, a fortiori, absolve the medieval jurists of blame for not integrating this task, which was unthinkable to them, into their claim to root ( taʾṣīl) legal qualifications ( aḥkām) in the Word of God, which would transform profane and contingent behavior into the categories of licit or illicit works compatible with the notion of a final judgment (see last judgment; good deeds; evil deeds; lawful and unlawful; record of human actions). Now, however, there is enough of the conceptual diversity necessary for the radicalization of a critique of Islamic reason that can be undertaken within a broader and more historically, sociologically and anthropologically sensitive perspective.
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== Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition / Islām ==

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Islām, submission, total surrender (to God) — maṣdar of the IVth form of the root S L M.

;I. Definition and Theories of Meaning.
;1.—Ḳurʾānic references.
The “one who submits to God” is the Muslim, of which the plural Muslimūn occurs very often throughout the sūras. Islām , on the other hand, occurs only eight times there; but the word must be considered in conjunction with the fairly common use of the verb aslama in the two meanings which merge into one another, “surrender to God”(aninner action) and “profession of Islām” , that is to say adherence to the message of the Prophet. The eight occurrences of Islām are as follows:—

a). Three verses stress its quality of interiority: “Whomsoever God desires to guide, He expands his breast to Islam” (VI, 125); Islām is a “call ” from God, which must prohibit falsehood (LXI, 7) and which places whoever receives it “in a light from his Lord” (XXXIX, 22).

b). Three other texts, constantly quoted through the centuries, stress the connection between islām and dīn [q.v.]. It is certainly appropria te in this context to translate dīn as “religion”, though without forgetting the idea of debt owed to God which it connotes. “Today, I have perfected your religion (dīn) for you; I have completed M y blessing upon you; I have approved islām for your religion” (V, 3), and “the religion, in the eyes of God, is islām” (III, 19). The surrender of the whole Self to God can alone render to Him the worship which is His due; whosoever should seek for another religion, his search would not be approved (cf. III, 85).

c). The action which operates islām supposes a “return” to God, tawba , a conversion. The Ḳurʾān speaks of “conversion to islām”—to condemn the unbelief (kufr) of those who had nevertheless made a profession of faith (IX, 74). Similarly it condemns the complacency of the Bedouins who boast of their islām “as if it were a favour on their part” (XLIX, 17). In addition: “Say: ‘Do not count your islām as a favour to me; nay, but rather God confers a favour upon you, in that He has guided you to belief, if it be that you are truthful” (ibid.). A little earlier, the very important verse XLIX, 14 had made a clear distinction between islām and īmān: “The Bedouins say: ‘we believe’. Say: you do not believe; rather say, ‘We surrender’ (aslamnā). Faith has not yet entered into your heart”.

It would therefore be an exaggeration to state, with A. J. Wensinck (The Muslim Creed), Cambridge 1922, 22), that “in the Ḳurʾān the terms islām and īmān are synonymous”. It is true that to recognize oneself as a Muslim and to be a believer are two existential realities which together take possession of a man’s whole being to ensure his salvation (ibid.). But the Ḳurʾān (XLIX, 14 and 17, and still more IX, 74) evokes an explicit profession of islām which is in no way a guarantee against the sin of kufr, and has no saving value unless it is the expression of faith. On comparing these verses with III, 19 and V, 3 (insistence on the idea of dīn), we see that the ḳurʾānic statements themselves urge men to make islām not merely a (general) act of submission and surrender to God, and not merely obedience to God’s commandments, but also an affirmation which grants ¶ admission to the ummat al-nabī , the “people of the Prophet”, whatever their inner dispositions. These diverse connotations were to recur througbout the ages, as a result of the self-awareness brought about by the umma.

;2.— Some ḥadīt̲h̲s.
In the collections of ḥadīt̲h̲s the emphasis, in defining islām , will be placed upon submission to God, expressed by deeds: above all, the prescribed acts of worship, including adoration of the One God, but also the k̲h̲ayrāt , “good works”. Thus, by way of example: in al-Buk̲h̲ārī. ii, 37 (ḥadīt̲h̲ of Gabriel), after defining īmān by its content (“to believe in God, in His angels, in the future life, in the prophets, in the resurrection”), the Prophet, in reply to the question “What is islām?”, replies: “islām is to adore God without associating anything with Him, to observe the ritual prayer (ṣalāt), to pay zakāt , to fast during the month of Ramaḍān ” (similar text in Muslim). But it is also “to give food (to the hungry) and to give the greeting of peace (salām) to those one knows, just as to those one does not know” (al-Buk̲h̲ārī, ii, 5). And the best islām will be that of the Muslim of whom one has to “fear neither the hand nor the tongue” (ibid., 4).

The Musnad of Ibn Ḥanbal (iii, 134; cf. A. J. Wensinck, op. cit., 23) states: “islām is external, faith belongs to the heart”. The act of “surrender to God” is therefore expressed by holding fast to the ritual observances and social behaviour prescribed by the religious Law. God alone judges men’s hearts, and hence the reality of faith; the judgement of men may concern itself with islām. The “science of fiḳh” has been called maḳām al-islām by the Ṣūfīs.

;3.—The relations between islām and imān.
The essential question of a theological order, which was discussed at a very early time and upon which the schools of fiḳh and kalām were divided, was that of the distinction or non-distinction between islām and faith, and of their connection. The answers will depend upon the view taken of each of these concepts. We shall not go again into the question of the various definitions of īmān [q.v.]. Here, very briefly, are the principal positions adopted.

a). The Muʿtazilī schools, who identify faith and prescribed works, similarly identify faith with islām: it being clearly understood that the right intention, the niyya , is necessary for the validity of the deed —“actions are valid only through the intentions,” says the ḥadīt̲h̲ (al-Buk̲h̲ārī, ii, 41). Whoever commits a grave transgression of the prescriptions of the Law loses the status of muʾmin and Muslim, and reverts to the status of kufr according to the Ḵh̲ārid̲j̲īs, to an “intermediate status” (between faith and unbelief) according to the Muʿtazdlīs.

b). Many Ḥanafīs (Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs) similarly consider islām and īmān to be synonymous, but define each of them essentially as verbal confession (iḳrār), sometimes linking this with intimate adherence, or at other times, following the Murd̲j̲iʾīs, with knowledge of the heart, or both of these. The Ḥanafī-Māturīdī texts of the Fiḳh Akbar I (doubtless 2nd/8th century) and of the Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa (3rd/9th century) ignore the question. Towards the end of the 4th/10th century, however, the Fiḳh Akbar II was to draw an at least nominal distinction. It was to state (a. 18) that current language distinguishes between īmān and islām, and that islām is defined as “total surrender (taslīm) and total obedience (inḳiyād) to the divine commandments”. The text adds: “there is no faith whatever without islām, and islām could not exist without faith; the one and the other are like the outside and the inside [“back and belly”, in ¶ the literal translation of A. J. Wensinck]; and religion (dīn) is a name which covers both of them, and all the commandments of the Law”. Here then īmān is as it were the inner, hidden reality of islām, from which it could not be separated.

c). In its definition of faith, the Ḥanbalī line insists upon affirmation by the tongue (ḳawl) and by deeds (aʿmāl), either with or without the addition, according to the texts, of adherence of the heart (taṣdīḳ). So much so that al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941) was to say, according to the Ṭabaḳāt al-Ḥanābila : “We cannot testify to the reality of the faith in a man so long as he does not carry out the totality of the laws of islām” (quoted by H. Laoust, La profession de foi d’Ibn Baṭṭa , Damascus 1958, 82, n. I). Islam in the sense of observance becomes the guarantee of faith. The Ḥanbalīs however were to remain faithful to the text of the Musnad cited above, and to the ʿAḳida VI of Ibn Ḥanbal, who affirms the distinction between islām and īmān. Accordingly, in the 4th/10th century, Ibn Baṭṭa returns to the Ḳurʾān, XLIX, 14 and affirms: “The term islām does not have the same meaning as the term īmān. Islām is a word which denotes the community of religion (milla), and īmān is a word which expresses an adherence of faith (taṣdīḳ)” (from the translation of H. Laoust, op. cit., 50/82). The choice of milla, and not dīn, in this text is characteristic: islām is “religion”, no longer solely in the sense of a debt due to God, but in the sense of a “religious community” attached and connected to a prophet (cf. below). Thus, in the 4th/10th century, we find the use of islām to denote the Muslim religion as an organized and differentiated religion. A century la ter, Ibn ʿAḳīl in the same way was to make islām obedience to the commandments of God. But he who commits à great transgression “does not lose his status of muʾmin to become merely Muslim, for islām forms part of īmān” (G. Makdisi. Ibn ʿAqīl et la résurgence de l’Islam traditionaliste au XI e siècle , Damascus 1963, 527).

d). The As̲h̲ʿarīs and the S̲h̲āfiʿī jusrists also made a distinction between islām and īmān. After defining faith as words and deeds, and then by its content according to the “ḥadīt̲h̲ of Gabriel”, al-As̲h̲ʿarī, in the credo of the Maḳālāt al-Islāmiyyīn (ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo n.d., i, 322, identifies islām with the two constituent parts of the s̲h̲ahāda , in other words with the verbal testimony which grants admission to the Community of the Prophet, and concludes: “islām is different from īmān”. The credo of the Ibāna (ed. Cairo 1348, 10), without defining islām, states that it is “wider than faith” and specifies “that all islām is not faith”. If we compare these views with the text of the Lumaʿ which above all regards faith as inner adherence (huwa taṣdīḳ, bi-llāh cf. R. J. McCarthy, The Theology of al-As̲h̲ʿarī , Beirut 1953, 75/104), we understand that the later As̲h̲ʿarīs were able to claim that islām, the observance of the prescriptions ordained by the Law, and above all the explicit profession of the s̲h̲ahāda, can be “practised” without faith, and that faith (inner taṣdīḳ) can exist without islām (here contradicting the Ḥanbalī line, for whom every believer is a Muslim). But islām without faith is the way of hypocrites (munāfiḳūn), consigned to God’s chastisement; faith without islām need not be culpable, in the event of some invincible external obstacle; it would become so if the testimony to islām was not given through cowardice, weakness or half-heartedness. It would then be a fault not of unbelief (kufr) but of grave prevarication (fisḳ).— When he summarizes the S̲h̲āfiʿī theses (which he contrasts with the identification madeby the Ḥanafīs), ¶ al-Ḏj̲urd̲j̲ānī says that “ islām is the verbal profession of faith without the agreement of the heart, while faith is the agreement of the heart and the tongue” (Taʿrīfāt , ed. Flügel, Leipzig 1845, 23).—This thesis was later to be generally accepted.

Whatever definition of faith might be proposed, it remains true however, for the Ḥanbalīs and the As̲h̲ʿarīs alike, that īmān and islām, without becoming identical, imply one another. Islām , says H. Laoust in summarizing the philosophy of Ibn Taymiyya (Contribution à une étude de la méthodologie canonique de (...) Ibn Taimīya , Cairo 1939, 74, n. 3), is the “external and so to speak social application of the Law”, and īmān in the “interiorization of islām”. (Thus once again, despite the difference of the conceptions involved, we corne across “the outside” and “the inside”, ẓahr and baṭn , of the Fiḳh Akbar II). —An outline of the most usual teaching is provided in the 19th century by the As̲h̲ʿarī al-Bād̲j̲ūrī (Ḥās̲h̲iya... ʿalā Ḏj̲awharat al-tawḥid , ed. Cairo 1352/1934, 28-9), who says: “Īmān and islām are different in their significance but not in truth, that is to say in the subjects (who profess them)... But it is a question here of faith which assures salvation, and of islām also, otherwise there would be no reciprocal connection”. The same nuances occur in the 20th century, for example in the Ḥayāt Muḥammad of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (Cairo 1358/1939, 506).—It should be noted finally that only certain As̲h̲ʿarīs and S̲h̲āfʿīs applied the term muʾmin , but not Muslim, to the man who has faith in his heart and who dies without having been able to profess islām. In general, it was considered preferable to call him Muslim, not before men but in the eyes of God.

;4.—The “world of islām”.
In this way, therefore, islām is “to give oneself unconditionally to God” (G. Makdisi, op. cit., 324); so much so that, as the yanballs were to take pleasure in saying, “the religion of all the prophets is islām”. Abraham, Moses and Jésus are true muslimūn. But it is the “seal of the prophecy”, manifested in the Ḳurʾān, which was to “perfect the religion”. According to the first part of a much quoted ḥadīt̲h̲ , “the best of all things is islām; the foundation of islām is the ritual prayer” and, with the ṣalāt , all the other obligations (ʿibādāt) prescribed by the Law. Now, it is the observance of the Law, its “external and so to speak social application” (H. Laoust), which is the binding force of the Community of the Prophet. And so wherever the ḳurʾānic prescriptions are observed communally, there islām will be; such will be “the lands of islām (bilād al-islām), “the world, the house, of islām” (dār al-islām).

Such expressions are traditional. It was in this way that, at the beginning of the 5th/11th century, al-Māwardī examined the various categories into which the bilād al-islām are divided (al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya , beginning of chap. xiv, ed. Cairo. n.d., 151 ff.). The implication remains that islām, practised in this way, is the testimony, rendered socially, to faith in the One God and to free adherence to the prophetie mission of Muḥammad. The Ḥanafī Sibṭ Ibn al-Ḏj̲awzī (d. 654/1256) in his Mirʾāt al-zamān mentioned the “purchased” conversions of Jews and Christians, which the As̲h̲ʿarīs sought to make in Bag̲h̲dād in the 5th/11th century, and he repeats the protests of the supporters of the s̲h̲arīf Abū Ḏj̲aʿfar, a Ḥanbalī: “This is the islām of gifts, not the islām of conviction” (quoted by G. Makdisi, op. cit., 356). Abū Ḥamid al-G̲h̲azālī was similarly to question the degree of validity of a forced conversion to islām. ¶

“There is no compulsion in religion” (Ḳurʾān, II, 256), and “religion, in the eyes of God, is in truth islām” (III, 19). Even in the writings of those who distinguish most sharply between īmān and islām, at no time will this reference to inner conviction be found absent. But the point of first importance, for the jurist who is studying and formulating the statutes and laws of the bilād al-islām, is not so much the degree of invidual interiorization of the muḳābal of reciprocal relationship islām-īmān , as the communal observance of those prescriptions which make islām, those s̲h̲aʿāʾir al-islām “the blazon of Islam” (L. Massignon), which are symbolized by the banners of the imāms , the guides of the Community.

This is so true that a synonym of dār al-islām was to be dār al-ʿadl “the world of justice”, in which “the rights of God and of men”, ordained by the Ḳurʾān are observed and protected. On the other hand there was to be the dār al-kufr “world of unbelief”, which is the dār al-ḥarb “world of war”. The jurists analyse the circumstances in which it can become “obligatory” to abandon the dār al-kufr in order to enter the dār al-islām or at least the dār al-ṣulḥ , which has concluded a treaty of “reconciliation” with the dār al-islām.—Anyone who describes himself as a Muslim means to affirm thereby not so much his care for the practice and personal observances (although certainly not neglecting such matters) as for adherence to a Community of those who acknowledge the Ḳurʾān and Muḥammad. It is here perhaps, far more than in any “sacral” conception of the political organization, that this specifie spiritual-temporal fusion of the Muslim City has its root.

;5.—From islām to Islam.
In European languages, it has become custemary to speak of Islam to denote the whole body of Muslim peoples, countries, and states, in their socio-cultural or political as well as in their religious sphere. And it is in a similar sense that modern Arabic often uses al-islām. What connection does this very general meaning retain or not retain with the etymological significance of the word, and its évocation of “surrender to God” ?

This question, an important one if we wish to avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings, has been discussed recently in a well-documented and apposite manner by Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith in The Meaning and End of Religion (New York 1964, chap. iv “The special case of Islam”, 75-108). As the author indicates, it is only recently (19th-20th centuries) that Islam has incontestably become the chosen term to signify both a religion and a politico-social area (fortunately replacing “Mohammedanism” “Islamism” and other such terms). Religious and cultural history thereby adopts the very name by which the bilād al-islām designate themselves, as with a title of honour. And it is merely since the beginning of the igth century, probably under the influence of Western ideas, that writers in Arabic have employed it in an equivalent way.

W. Cantwell Smith emphasises, by reference to Brockelmann’s Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur , that this term islām, though comparatively rare in the Ḳurʾān, with the passage of time appears more and more frequently in the titles of works in Arabic. In the classical period (the Western Middle Ages) it was already used more commonly than īmān, and often in correlation with niẓām , System, organization; in the 19th century, the relative figures for īmān and islām are 7% and 93% respectively. It is this that Prof. Cantwell Smith calls “reification in Islam”. The emphasis thus appears to be placed on Islam as the organization and self-defence of the Community which is its expression, and much less on the inner ¶ Personal values which the etymology of the word connotes. It appears however that our present brief examination of the use of islām according to Muslim formulations and usage itself may suggests a few remarks here, which do not invalidate, but which limit and qualify the slightly different perspective of Prof. Cantwell Smith.

a). If it strue that islām signifies primarily the action and state of the man who surrenders himself totally (to God), nevertheless it would be errcneous to regard it, in this etymological sense, as a kind of synonym for tawakkul bi-llāh , the (interiorized) “abandoning” of oneself entirely into the hands of God. As the Ḳurʾān understands the word, islām is indeed, as the Fiḳh Akbar II says, a surrender (taslīm) to the divine Will as expressed by the ḳurʾānic teaching, and an obedience (inḳiyād) to His commandments; and, by this very means, admission to the Community, “the best to have arisen among men” (Ḳurʾān, III, no). Quite soon, admission to the Community was to be the aspect preferred. If the requisite inner attitude does not correspond to it, there is some grave individual failing (fiṣk), there is no abandonment of islām.

b). Prof. Cantwell Smith observes that, in the classical age, the diversity of religious beliefs was to express itself by milal rather than by adyān. But we have already noted that the Ḥanbalī Ibn Baṭṭa, in the 4th century, defined islām as a milla , hence a community, the Community of Muḥammad. The difference between dīn and milla, al-Ḏj̲urd̲j̲ānī said (Taʿrifāt , iii), is that “dīn relates to God, and milla to the Prophet”.

c). The Ḳurʾān however defines islām as religion, dīn (III, 19; V, 3); but not as a religion, Prof. Cantwell Smith justly notes. The plural of dīn, adyān, he further notes, does not occur in the Ḳurʾān. But if the religion, al-dīn , which renders to God that which is due to Him, is indeed islām, it is, through that very fact, millat al-nabī and ummat al-nabī. For the Muslim, Islam is not one religion among others, it is the religion, and the other religions (al-adyān) are such only in so far as they participate in Islam. Each prophet sent from God has his milla; but the dīn is unique, accomplished by surrender to God and obedience—the very definition of islām— already lived by the prophets that preceded it, and expressed accordingly to all its needs by the “seal” of the revelation, the Ḳurʾān.

We do not think that these various connotations are absent from the Muslim works of the contemporary period. To take one example only, we find them in the Risālat al-tawḥīd of Muḥammad ʿAbduh. “The religion of Islam, or Islam”, says ʿAbduh, “is the religion brought by Muḥammad” (Cairo 1353, 152). And the whole final section of the Risāla constantly speaks in this sense of Islam, its principles, its spirit and its extension in the world (ibid., 152-206, French trans., Paris 1925, 104-40). As soon as the ummat al-nabī began to expand in space and time in the face of other religious communities, what Prof. Cantwell Smith calls “reification” was found to be inscribed in the original fundamental data. Historical realities on the one hand, and the progress of the phenomenology of religions on the other, have not ceased to confront Muslim thought with this twofold fact: the existence of non-Muslim religions, established in their faith and their ritual observances, and, moreover, the uncertain faith and the failure to “practise” by certain men who none the less continue to invoke the help of the umma. Hence the anxiety to defend Islam as a religion and a community, while nevertheless the old Ḥanbalī and As̲h̲ʿarī distinction ¶ between īmān and islām is repeated and emphasized.

But this distinction, however generally admitted it may be, is in no way intended to justify the proclamation of islām by one who denies īmān or who even does not bother to appreciate the true values of faith. Those who are Muslims simply through having heard the call of Islam, or because they were born of Muslim parents, but who do not have faith in their hearts, then, according to what Muḥammad ftusayn Haykal more or less says (loc. cit.), their islām is feeble and sickly. Only those who seek for a sincere faith (īmān ṣādiḳ) hear the call to Islām with regard to God alone.

At the present time there are three meanings of the word islām says Prof. Cantwell Smith (op. cit., 107): 1) the immediate existential meaning of personal surrender of oneself entirely to God; 2) the empirical reality of the “world of Islam”, as it exists sociologically; 3) the ideal Muslim community—“a concrete historical ideal” we would gladly say—as it must tend towards its realization. These three meanings in fact remain closely bound together in Muslim thought, today as in the past, and no study of Islam, no analysis of the Muslim Community or of the world of Islam should separate them.

;Bibliography
in the article.

(L. Gardet)

;ii.—Diffusion of Islam
In our present state of knowledge, the diffusion of Islam can only be studied in broad outline. In the first place, with regard to numbers, we often have to be content with approximations; nor should it be forgotten that, with the world population increasing at an accelerated pace, even the most accurate statistics prove to be out of date within a few years. Moreover it sometimes happens that in certain countries Muslims and non-Muslims adopt different sets of figures, particularly when these figures serve as the basis for political claims or considerations of honour. In the second place, such figures do not reflect the qualitative aspect of this diffusion. It is possible for conversions on a massive scale to be produced within the space of a few years (as in the case of the Galla tribes in Ethiopia, to the west of Harar, in about 1930-50). But it must not be forgotten that, for these conversions, the way had sometimes been prepared over a long period, by a whole process of maturing and by f avourable circumstances which, in themselves, cannot be statistically expressed.

;A.—General Survey.
The diffusion of Islam has been the consequence of a certain number of factors which are more or less easily discernable; over and above the particular attraction this religious movement has exerted upon men, the personality of its first leaders and the economic circumstances of Arabia at the time, among other things, there is a further point which requires to be examined—the part played by wars. Even if, in the vast majority of cases, the conquered remained free not to change their religion, the introduction by force of arms of a Muslim régime which took upon itself the administration of their country represented the first stage of a process which was bound to end in their gradual conversion.

The conquest itself was not brought about suddenly. It was often achieved in waves, with ebb and flow, but it was governed by a tide which, save in Europe, proved to be rising ever higher. Thus Damascus, reached as early as 13/634 by reconnaissance units, was attacked and conquered much later; recaptured by the Byzantines, it finally fell into the Arabs’ hands ¶ in 636. Similarly Tunisia, wlicru a first raid in 26/647 was followed by a respite of more than twenty years before the final conquest and the founding of Ḳayrawān (50/670). So too Transoxiana to which, after an initial invasion in 52-4/672-4, the Arabs returned at the beginning of the following century; or Chinese Turkestān, reached in 93/713, and to which they returned in 133/751 Kābūl in Afg̲h̲ānistān was reached by the end of the 1st/7th century, without being occupied, and two centuries were to pass before the Muslims came back in strength to stay. Muslim warfare had been a war of movement, a war of wide spaces, steppes or deserts.

The first period of expansion extends from the death of Muḥammad to the end of the Umayyad caliphate of Damascus. One century was enough for the Muslims to achieve an extraordinary epic feat. The dynamism of the new community combined with favourable circumstances to allow their success. The weakness of the Persians and the Byzantines after decades of war between them, their exhaustion, which caused them to underestimate the newcomers’ strength, the internal conditions within the Roman empire of Byzantium which was then in difficulties, with its territory being engulfed by the barbarian invasions, the resentment of the various peoples ruled by Byzantium, the divisions among the Christians, all these considerations worked in favour of the Muslims. But the new fact, as compared with the multiple barbarian invasions of the time, is that the barbarians were assimilated by the countries they conquered, whereas Islam on the contrary imposed itself upon the old civilizations. The most remarkable point about the diffusion of Islam is not so much the fact of the conquests as that of their permanence. When Islam became the religion of a territory, it never thereafter ceased to be so, except in Europe (and even then under armed pressure), and except in the centre and south of India, where many of the Hindu sultanates were revived after the first Muslim conquests.

In this way, we can trace the conquests of Syria-Palestine (13/634-19/640), Egypt 18/639-22/642), the Maghrib (49/699-85/705), Spain and Narbonnese Gaul 92/711-85/705), and, in the east, of ʿIrāḳ (15/636-20/641), Armenia and then Iran (21/642), as far as Transoxiana and Chinese Turkestān. The river Indus was reached in 91-4/710-3, but these advanced positions were afterwards abandoned.

In the direction of Byzantium, which was besieged without success, the Muslim advance was blocked in Asia Minor where a state of flux for long prevailed.

In East Africa, colonies of Muslim merchants are recorded at a very early date at trading dépôts on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

Under the ʿAbbāsids, these conquests were rounded off with the capture of Mediterranean islands such as the Balearics and Sicily. But, most important, Muslim culture was gradually taking shape, increasing the spread of Islam, and the populations, while left free to retain their faith, little by little adhered to the new religion, the religion of the ruling class and of the new society. In Spain, however, Islam was confronted by the Reconquest, which started early and eventually culminated in the fali of Granada in 1492.

Everywhere else, however, expansion continued, sometimes by force of arms, sometimes by peaceful proselytism. Towards the year 1000, the first stage in the conquest of India began: finally the whole Ganges valley was conquered in about 488/1192-606/1209. Various raids during the 8th/14th century ¶ sueeeeded iu bringiug alinost the whole peniusula under the domination of the Muslims. They were however obliged to withdraw from many regions, especially in the centre and south. Islam came to Indonesia by way of a Muslim centre situated in the north-west of Sumatra, at the end of the 7th/13th century; in the 8th/14th century, Java was governed by Muslim rulers.

In sub-Saharan West Africa, it was shortly after the year 1000 that Islam was established. There is mention of a Muslim prince at the head of the Sonraīs at Gao on the Niger as early as 400/1009-10. Islamic rulers are found at Kanem (north of Lake Chad) in about 473/1081-90/1097. Little by little, Muslim kingdoms appeared (in particular Mali, in the 7th/13th I century); but their Islam was still a religion of the court of the warlike or literate aristocracies, which had no contact with the masses. It was later, with the military activities (especially of the Eulanis) and the activities of the brotherhoods that the islamization of the masses was brought about, during the 18th and 19th centuries. Under colonial rule the process of conversion was extended still further.

In East Africa, Islam began to spread from Zaylaʿ (a port situated opposite Aden) a centre of islamization even in the 6th/12th century. Climbiug up to assail the high Ethiopian plateaux, where they never succeeded in gaining a real foothold, the Muslims established themselves firmly in the less elevated regions to the east and south (especially in Harar).

In the Nile valley, the Christian kingdoms of Nubia held out uiitil the 8th/9th-14th/16th centuries, when they disappeared. The islamization of Nilotic Sudan was followed by that of the minor kingdoms situated between the Nile and Chad. In the 18th century, Islam came to predominance to the south of the Sahara, from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, except ouly in the Ethiopian Highlands.

Along the Gulf of Guinea, the impenetrable equatorial forest—even when not infested with tsetse flies— for a long time halted the shepherds who were the Muslim conquerors of the territory. But with the modern age the situation has changed. With the conversion of a section of the Yorubas (near Lagos) and penetration into other tribes hitherto reputed to be impossible to convert, with the movements of populations characteristic of countries today, this forest no longer forms a boundary, and many Muslims intermingle with the inhabitants of the coastal towns.

The commercial centres on the African coast of the Indian Ocean, which remained isolated in their world of business transactions, gradually became stronger (especially in the 4th/10th century). But it was in the 19th and 20th centuries that they became centres of islamization; the suppression of siavery and the opening of the hinterland had swept away the barriers that confined them to their trading-ports. Consequently there has been a considerable, though recent, advance by Islam in these zones during the last half-century (Kenya, Tanzania and evôn to the eastern Congo).

In all these conquered lands in Asia or Africa, or in all the sultanates ruled by Muslims, a special world was created, the Muslim world, where life, art and thought were marked by Islam, even though many traces of the past still survived. The simple imposition of a foreign political framework was very quickly followed by the adoption inwardly of Muslim values.

Finally, to conclude this general survey, it should be noted that the attack launched by the Ottoman Turks finally, in 1453, swept away the barrier of ¶ Constantinople. Europe was invaded as far as Vienna which was twice besieged, in 1529 and 1683, though without success. The ebb then followed, partieularly in the 19th century and at the start of the 20th.

;B.—Present characteristics.
If we attempt to trace on a modern map the distribution of Muslims throughout the world, it becomes apparent that Islam is a religion which is almost confined to Asia and Africa. The only exceptions to this rule are some millions of Muslims in Turkey in Europe and in the Balkans, migrant and transient workers in western Europe, and immigrants in North and South America.

In the countries where Christian minorities remain, as well as in pagan countries, Islam is making progress, above all because, in order to be truly integra ted into Muslim society, it is necessary to be a Muslim. Since this integration alone permits certain marriages, the proportion of the conversions to Islam undertaken on the occasion of marriages is very high. This integration also facilitates the finding of employment and advancement to higher posts. In certain countries, questions of social castes sometimes enter, since conversions take place partieularly in certain strata of the population. But however that may be, in view of the simplicity of the Muslim dogma which places man face to face with God the Creator and Providence, and in view too of the aspect of fraternity which Islam presents to the newcomer (especially when he is received into a brotherhood), man’s fundamental religious sense is satisfied. Thus the step to be taken does not deter anyone who is no longer greatly attached to his old religion.

Tolerance for ancient customs has also played a part in many countries, since Islam requires merely a profession of faith for a convert to be able to enter the community. Then, little by little, islamization has been effected in depth. Moreover, Muslim society, which gave the new member the satisfaction of belonging to a vast community covering the entire world, with its own military, cultural, religious and political renown, has always exerted effective control over him. While leaving those who served it very free, from the moment they made their profession of faith, it has always been at pains to protect its members from any possible proselytism and, above all, to prevent them from leaving Islam once they have adopted it. Until recently, the apostate was put to death; even now, proselytism is still strongly disapproved, and the man who deserts Islam cuts himself off from his own people, save in exceptional cases, even though modern jurists no longer authorize the death penalty for apostasy.

Paradoxically, among the features which have favoured the expansion of Islam during these last decades must be included colonial occupation. In many cases the occupying powers relied on Muslim elements possessing a higher degree of civilization than the pagans, in the countries where these still survived. Alternatively, it placed without discrimination under the same legal System inspired by Islam, both Muslims and those who were neither Muslim nor Christian. In the same way, by destroying the tribal framework of African paganism, colonialism created the great numbers of rootless people who have found in Islam a justification for social existence. All the more since Islam has presented itself as a native religion, not as a colonial importation, while the difference in the standard of living, so obvious in the case of Christians newly arrived from Europe, did not arise between Muslims and pagans, who all sprang from the same soil. Peace too has assisted the movement ¶ of preachers or merchants belonging to brotherhoods.

In Black Africa, the ḳurʾānic schools have been centres of Muslim expansion, both through the scope they have given for zeal to have effect, and also through the number of future propagators of Islam who have been formed there. The poverty of the material equipment in the great majority of these establishments, like that of the curricula, must not be misinterpreted. Thanks to these, the values which the children there have learnt to respect, above all the sense of dedication and pride in belonging to the Muslim community, have profoundly marked whole regions. The story of David and Goliath is repeated in these schools in the triumph of poor resources. At the present time, incidentally, in many Muslim countries the official school has replaced the ḳurʾānic school.

The conditions affecting the expansion of Islam are extremely variable, according to the countries concemed, and we should not make any attempt to systematize them. There are large organizations working through pamphlets (like the Aḥmadiyya in Pakistan); there is the sending out of teachers and preachers; there is a whole System of instruction by radio. But the Muslim missionary apparatus is infinitely less cumbrous than that of the Christians. It is the natives of the country concerned who open schools, after having been sometimes (though not always) educated at centres abroad. It is the Muslims themselves, especially the merchants, who bear the chief responsibility for the missions. Finally, the brotherhoods have played a very great part in this movement. But whatever the differences, it is striking to observe wherever Islam is established, the same pride in the community, with as a consequence a certain number of common basic attitudes, affecting the manner of life and thought. This pride and its consequences, by favouring a certain impermeability to foreign influences, have been powerful weapons in resistance to colonialism.

For some thirty years, the Muslim world has been evolving very rapidly. Universities have been founded [see d̲j̲āmiʿa ]. The instability of the world economy has made itself felt everywhere. Travels and contacts have multiplied. Socialism has changed the face of many societies. But, above all, Islam has adopted modern methods of communication— pamphlets, radio, relevision, etc. The number of people who listen on their transistors to sermons in Ramaḍān is now vast.

;C.—Statistical outline.
Basing themselves on the figures for world population valid in about 1960, some good authors priva tely estima ted that there might be 435 million Muslims in the world. At the present time, with the increase in population, they now exceed 500 millions.

The figures which follow will indicate a total based upon the statistics for the populations of individual countries (in 1966), as centained in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1967). After that, the article will provide details, so far as it is possible to do so, of the proportion of Muslims within the different countries. Figures given without further details signify the number in terms of thousands.

;1.—Africa
(perhaps 130 million Muslims out of 318 million inhabitants).

a) Arabic speaking Africa (perhaps 70 million Muslims)

Morocco 13,451 (Muslims only)

—Mauritania 1,070

—Algeria 12,102 (total population)

—Tunisia 4,458 (id.)

—Libya 1,676 (id.)¶

—E.A.R. (Egypt) 30,083, two million of whom are Christian

—Sudan (Khartoum) 13.940, 70% of whom are Muslim

b) Africa south of the Sahara , excluding the Sudan (perhaps 60 million Muslims)

—Somalia 2,580, of whom 99% are Muslim

—Nigeria 58,600 (?), of whom 43% are Muslim

—Ethiopia 23,000 (?), of whom 40 to 50% are Muslim

—Senegal 3,490, of whom 75% are Muslim

—Niger 3,433, of whom 72% are Muslim

—Mali 4,654, of whom 65% are Muslim

—Guinea 3,608, of whom 62% are Muslim

—Chad 3,361, of whom 55% are Muslim

—Upper Volta 4,955, of whom 26% are Muslim

—Tanzania 10,717, of whom 23% are Muslim

—Ghana 7,945, of whom 20% are Muslim

—Cameroon 5,350, of whom 20% are Muslim

—Kenya 9,643, of whom 10% are Muslim

Smaller numbers of Muslims are found in the following countries, in which they represent respectively the proportion of the population as indicated:

—Sierra Leone 33%, Gambia 73%, Portuguese Guinea 26%, Ivory Coast 25%, Dahomey 15%, Libéria 15%, Mozambique 11%, Malawi 7%, Botswana 5%, Togo 5%. Eisewhere the proportion is still smaller.

N.B. A better knowledge of the countries to the south of the Sahara made it possible, in about 1945, to assert the existence of numerous isolated pagan communities in regions thought to be wholly islamized (certain zones of Chad, North Cameroon, North Nigeria). Since then, a movement has been started among these pagans for conversion to Islam; in north-western Nigeria, this was vigorously supported by the political authorities, in the years preceding the disturbances of 1965.

For Nigeria, the reader will note a very clearly marked break in the rate of growth of population. As, until 1952, this was following a regular increasing curve, the figures given since that date correspond with an acceleration which requires to be explained before it can be accepted.

For Ethiopia, to which Eritrea has since been added, the Annuaire du Monde Musulman , 1954, accepts only half the figure officially given (cf. p. 389).

;2.— Asia (perhaps 390 million Muslims out of 1,868 million inhabitants)
a) Arab countries of Asia (perhaps 29 million Muslims), the principal centres being:

—Saudi Arabia 6,870

—Yemen 5,000

—Irak 8,338, of whom 95% are Muslim

—Syria 5,450, of whom 88% are Muslim

—Lebanon 2,460, of whom 50% are Muslim

—Jordan 2.040, of whom 92% are Muslim

b) Islam in the USSR, 30 million (?) Muslims

c). Islam in the Middle East (perhaps 72 million Muslims), in

—Turkey 31,880, of whom 99% are Muslim

—Iran 25,781, of whom 98% are Muslim

—Afghanistan 15,960 (almost all Muslim).

d) Islam in Pakistan , India, Ceylon and Burma (perhaps 145 million Muslims), the two major groups being

—Pakistan 105,044, of whom 86% are Muslim

—India 498,680, of whom perhaps 11% are Muslim

e). Islam in China , 15 million (?) Muslims

f). Islam in South East Asia (perhaps 100 million Muslims), chiefly located in

—Indonesia 107,000, of whom 87% are Muslim¶

—Malaysia and Singapore 10,212, of whom 44% are Muslim

—Philippines 33,477, of whom 5% are Muslim.

;3.— Europe.
A little less than 5 million Muslims in the Balkans, to whom must be added the Muslim workers in western Europe, so far as they have not been included in the figures for their respective countries of origin.

To conclude this survey, the figure of 525 million Muslims might be suggested for the year 1966, a year during which the total world population has been estimated at 3,356 million inhabitants. The Muslims would represent about one-sixth of all human beings, or slightly less.

(J. Jomier)

;Bibliography
Since the list of books concerning this subject is too long to be given in full, the reader is referred to the bibliographies relating to the different countries dealt with above. A general survey of the expansion of Islam will be found in some historical atlases, such as the Historical Atlas ofthe Muslim Peoples, Djambatan-Amsterdam 1957. See also: L. Massignon, Annuaire du Monde Musulman, Paris 1955

U.N.E.S. C.O., Statistical Yearbook, 1967 (giving the figures for 1966). Some statistics are published by a number of countries: Religion in the Middle East, ii, London 1969

Bilan du Monde 1960, Encyclopédie du Monde Chrétien, ed. Casterman, ii, 1964

J. Ducruet and M. Martin, Statistiques Chrétiennes d’Egypte, in Travaux et Jours, Beirut no. 24 (July-Sept. 1967), 65-75.

;Cite this page
Gardet, L. and J. Jomier, “Islām”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 28 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0387>{{refbegin2|}}

== 2022 ==

;История
Ислам возник в начале VII века в Западной Аравии ([[Хиджаз]]) среди [[араб]]ских племен в период разложения родоплеменных отношений и образования классового общества и государства. До появления ислама, в [[Аравия|Аравии]] бытовали местные [[язычество|языческие]] культы, учения [[христианство|христиан]], [[иудаизм|иудеев]] и автохтонный арабский [[монотеизм]] ([[ханиф]]изм)<!--Гогоберидзе-->. Основатель ислама — [[пророк]] [[Мухаммад]] {{сас}} (ум. 632) из [[мекка]]нского племени [[курайшит]]ов. С точки зрения исламской догматики, Мухаммад {{сас}} является последним в череде пророков, начиная с первого человека — [[Адам]]а. В 610 году он объявил себя пророком (''наби'') и посланником (''расуль'') единого [[Бог]]а [[Аллах]]а. Мухаммад {{сас}} выступил с идеей очищения древних учений пророков от искажений и возвращения к истинной религии, идущей от Ибрахима (Авраама) {{ас}}<!-- Грицанов-->. Столкнувшись с сопротивлением со стороны мекканских многобожников, в 622 году он с небольшой группой приверженцев [[Эмиграция|переселился]] из Мекки в [[Медина|Медину]], где сложилась мусульманская община — ''[[община|умма]]'', ставшая ядром будущего мусульманского государства (Халифат)<!--Кузнецов-->. Теократический характер власти пророка Мухаммада {{сас}} утверждал нераздельность духовной и светской власти в руках главы мусульманской общины<!--Гогоберидзе-->.

В исламе существует два главных источника вероучения решения религиозных, социально-политических, правовых проблем, возникающих перед мусульманской общиной — [[Коран]] (несотворенное «слово Божье») и [[Сунна]] («Священное предание», изложенное в сборниках [[Хадис|рассказов]] о деяниях и изречениях Пророка {{сас}})<!--Кузнецов-->.

На основе Корана и Сунны в VIII века начал оформляться свод мусульманских законов, юридических норм, правил поведения, социально-религиозной жизни и поступков мусульманина (''шариат'')<!--Кузнецов-->.

Во второй половине VII века в связи с решением вопроса о наследовании верховной власти в исламе образовались три основные направления: [[суннизм]], [[шиизм]] и [[хариджизм]]<!--Кузнецов-->. Раскол оказал огромное влияние на формирование исламской идеологии и политическую судьбу исламского мира. На рубеже VII—VIII веков среди мусульман возникают расхождения в понимании [[вера|веры]] (''иман''), предопределении и в отношении к человеку, совершившему «тяжкий» [[грех]]. В VIII веке среди богословов возникают споры о природе и атрибутах Бога. Споры о природе Корана разделили мусульман на сторонников [[сотворённость|сотворённости]] Корана и на противников этого представления. К середине VIII века в исламе образовалось, по крайней мере, пять основных религиозно-политических группировок — сунниты, шииты, хариджиты, мурджииты и мутазилиты. При халифе аль-Мамуне (813—833) впервые в исламской истории была предпринята попытка ввести «сверху» систему государственного вероисповедания, включавшую элементы мутазилитских догматов, что вызвало бурный протест «традиционалистов» (''ахль аль-хадис'')<!--Гогоберидзе-->. Шииты верят, что в конце времён явится «скрытый» имам аль-Махди, который спасёт верующих в него и «наполнит для них мир правдой и справедливостью».

В XVIII—XIX веках внутри ислама оформляется мистико-аскетическое течение — [[суфизм]], согласно которому высшей целью жизни является отрешение от земного и мистическое соединение [[душа|души]] человека с Богом. В мусульманском мире имеется более сотни суфийских школ (такрикатов). В середине XVIII века в среде [[ханбалит]]ского [[мазхаб]]а возникло религиозно-политическое течение — [[ваххабизм]], проповедовавший возврат к первоначальным исламским принципам и очищение ислама от поздних наслоений и нововведений (''бида'')<!--Кузнецов-->.

Несмотря на множество различных исламских течений, среди мусульман существует стойкое убеждение в принадлежности к единой общности людей (умме), объединенных общей верой, традициями, начальной историей и общими интересами в мире<!-- Кириленко-->.

;Догматы
Исламское вероучение базируется на неразделенности религии, права, догматики и ритуала. Основной исламский догмат — строгий монотеизм (''[[таухид]]''), вера в единого Бога Аллаха и пророческую миссию Мухаммада {{сас}}. Отрицаются христианские догматы Троицы, боговоплощения, искупления и иудейская концепция богоизбранного народа. Догматико-ритуальной основой ислама являются пять основных религиозных предписаний («столпов»):
# [[Свидетельство веры|символ веры]] (''аш-шахада''): «Нет Бога, кроме единого Аллаха, и Мухаммад — пророк его»;
# [[молитва]] (араб. ''салят'', перс. ''намаз'');
# [[пост]] в священный месяц [[рамадан]] (араб. ''ас-саум'', перс. ''ураза'');
# обязательная уплата ежегодного [[налог]]а, взимаемого с имущества богатых в пользу нуждающихся мусульман (''[[закят]]'').
# [[паломничество]] в Мекку, к священной [[аль-Ка‘ба|Каабе]] (аль-Ка‘бе) и другим святыням (''[[хадж]]'')<!--Кузнецов-->.

Ислам запрещает пить [[вино]], есть [[свинина|свинину]], изображать людей и [[животные|животных]] и т. д.<!--Кузнецов-->

Одно из ключевых понятий в исламе — ''[[иман]]'' ([[вера]]), включающую в себя веру в Аллаха, Его [[ангел]]ов, [[Писания]], пророков, в [[Судный день]] и [[предопределение]]<!--Кузнецов-->. Аллах, в исламе — Творец [[небеса|небес]] и [[земля|земли]], по воле которого совершаются все события в окружающем [[мир]]е. Аллах обещает место в [[рай|раю]] за неуклонное выполнение религиозных предписаний, и грозит вечными [[мучения]]ми в [[ад]]у [[неверующий|неверующим]] и [[грешник]]ам<!--Фролов-->.

Высшая ступень веры — ''[[ихсан]]'', истолкованное Пророком {{сас}} как «Поклонение Аллаху так, как будто ты видишь Его, и если даже ты не видишь Его, то, поистине, Он тебя видит». ''Ислам'', ''иман'' и ''ихсан'' составляют общее понятие «''[[дин]]''» — [[религия]], где под ихсаном подразумевается [[искренность]] при исполнении религиозных обязанностей<!--Кузнецов-->.

Среди людей, не исповедующих ислам, особо выделяются «[[люди Писания]]», к которым относятся иудеи, христиане и сабии, которые верят в того же Бога, что и мусульмане, но их учение искажено или забыто. Поэтому Аллах направил своего последнего пророка Мухаммеда с божьим словом — Кораном<!-- Кириленко-->.

;Коран
Слово ''ислам'' — отглагольное существительное (''масдар'') четвёртой породы глагола ''с-л-м'', образованного от глагола первой породы ''слим'' (мир, безопасность, благополучие). Слово ''ислам'' имеет два значения: 1. быть благополучным; оставаться целым, невредимым; 2. спасаться, избавляться<!--http://www.islam.by/at/?id=405-->.

Согласно богословской традиции, Коран был ниспослан Аллахом через ангела Джабраиля пророку Мухаммаду {{сас}} в форме откровений в проповедях, обращенных к соплеменникам. В Коране отсутствует систематическое изложение основ мусульманской религиозной догматики; в нём содержатся лишь основные положения, которые позднее были разъяснены и приведены в систему мусульманскими богословами<!-- Кириленко-->.

;Роль ислама
Ислам играет важную роль в политической и социальной и культурной жизни исламских стран, а также в международных отношениях. Основная социальная форма жизни мусульман — исламская община (''умма'').

В последние годы возникло немало региональных и международных организаций, объединяющих мусульман (например, Организация исламского сотрудничества)<!--Кузнецов-->.